A Defense of Eros As A Natural and Necessary Desire

Desires are attributed as the strongest motivators for human action. Indeed, these desires can range from that of the social positive to the natural negative. However few things are necessary for a robust and fulfilling life, or perhaps a life without pain will suffice. Typical Epicurean thought categorizes desires by their level of necessity and their fulfillment, that is to say, whether they are natural or empty. Many questions could be asked inquiring into the true meaning of empty, for if the Epicureans hold a reductionist view, then there should be nothing as truly empty. But there seem to be differences drawn between the elements of the world and human desire. Friendship can be thought of as one of the most crucial elements of happiness. It is the only socially positive desire that the Epicureans define as natural and necessary. 

But a deeper investigation is required of friendship. Specifically, Epicureans makes a clear distinction between eros and friendship. The former is categorized as a natural desire, but unnecessary. It is necessary to consider the differences and similarities between friendship and eros to understand a paradox present in this categorization of needs. 
Hedonism directs an individual to pursue pleasure and avoid sources of pain. But there are desires that create pleasure that can not be fulfilled just the same as the fear of death will never be diminished. Epicurean thought holds that neither is truly attainable because they fail to exist at the same time as happiness does. When thinking of death, it will never be relevant as long as one has their own existence. And existence will not be relevant after one has died. This is an understandable conclusion as the two exist contradictions when holding a reductionist point of view. However, this line of thinking can not be carried into the consideration of some desires. Eros will always have the potential to exist as it necessarily requires the existence of an individual. This desire can be satisfied, but it is the nature of its fulfillment that remains. 

Eros has been described to be tyrannical for its defining feature, the effect it has on the individual it occupies. Indeed, there are countless descriptions in classical Greek literature that ascribe madness, obsession, and pain to eros. Epicurus is known to have described eros as a sort of madness that occurs as a result of an intense desire for sex accompanies by anguish. Subsequently, there is the advocacy against marriage and having children. 

But despite the woes, eros is so compelling on the heart it drives human motivation. This, of course, is most famously seen in the compelling speeches within Plato’s Symposium. Socrates recollection of a conversation with Diotima frames eros as a thing of the divine and almost entirely good, 

“Then love,' she said, 'may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?' 'That is most true.'” . 

Prior to Epicurean thought, eros is held as divine and necessary. Of course the Platonic view on eros shifts between the Symposium and the Republic, but its presence remains lofty. Sappho recognizes goodness and describes eros to be bittersweet. The passionate love that both the gods and human experience is multifaceted. There are speeches dedicated to its existence and emotional havoc because as a feeling, it can not be consolidated in any way without taking from its complexity. This complexity appears sequentially; there is the sweetness and pleasure from love followed by its problematic half. It is this ordering of possibilities that defers reason from its pleasures. The madness and tyranny that are commonly attributed to eros imply that the source of its pains is a matter of control. The subject and object of this control must be further explored as well as additional questions surrounding the implication of being controlled and being in control. It can be the case that the individual in love is under the control of desire, but that individual still has autonomy. They maintain control of themselves however blinded by a desire just as they seek, or have, control over the subject of their desire. Eros appears now as an ongoing strain for control over oneself and another. But this strain is one where it appears there will be no winner, for any individual will always have control over themselves. If both parties are equally pulling for control over themselves, there can be no movement of control between the two. The strain of desire then is maintaining oneself and while this strain is painful, it results in no loss. It is therefore not reasonable to proclaim eros as that which pain triumphs pleasure. It is not a purely neutral experience but it does not result in loss. 

The necessary and natural social desire that will lead to happiness is friendship. But this friendship needs to be investigated Friendship is not necessary because of the pleasure it provides, but rather it is necessary because reasoning proves that pleasure is maximized through friendship. This does require a consenting acknowledgment that the pleasure from the relationship outweighs whatever pains may accompany it. But any agreement can be broken unilaterally. There will forever be a risk involved in any social agreement and friendship is no exception. Ceirco states that since the desire of friendship exists not through nature but through reason, then the first law of any friendship should be an agreement to only act virtuously towards each other. 

Even if friendship maximizes an individual's social pleasure, it does not guarantee that there will be an absence of pain in the future. Even if there is a mutual agreement to only act virtuously in accordance with each other, there is no regard for the conduct towards others. If one’s friend is to have been involved in a crime, then the friend, by nature of the virtues required in friendship, must necessarily defend the guilty or at least assist in a way that will benefit them. If the individual chooses not to, then they lack trust which is the opposite of friendship Surely this will cause the individual pain that potentially trumps the pleasure of friendship. At this point, the individual must make a cost-benefit analysis where the cost of the friendship will perhaps be too grand of a pain to maintain. Friendship in this instance is no longer a necessary desire as it very well could produce pains grander than a life without friendship. 

With all that has been stated above, the argument supporting the exclusion of eros as a necessary desire is weakened. Of course, the desire for sex can be framed as an empty desire similar to that of the desire of fame and money, but all desires in excess bring pain and lack fulfillment. If Ceirco’s law of friendship requiring a mutual agreement to act virtuously is necessary for friendship, then the same agreement should be made between an individual and the one they desire. In both instances, there is the active participation of the involved parties giving all that they can at that moment, their word. Reason directs towards friendship, but reason can not deter from eros. Indeed, there is a calculated risk that must be made as there can be no pleasure derived from eros without pain. But the guarantee of the combination of the two leads to the possibility that the pain endured and the pleasure felt are balanced. If this is the case, then it is not more justifiable to deny eros than it is to pursue it. 

References

Carson, Anne. 2014. Eros the Bittersweet: An Essay. N.p.: Princeton University Press.

J. M. Rist, Epicurus on Friendship (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 127-39. n.d.

Konstan, David. 2005. “Epicurus (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/#EpicLife.

McNeill, David N. “Human Discourse, Eros, and Madness in Plato’s ‘Republic.’” The Review of Metaphysics 55, no. 2 (2001): 235–68. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20131707. n.d.

Melchert, Norman, and David R. Morrow. 2018. The Great Conversation: A Historical Introduction to Philosophy. N.p.: Oxford University Press.

Plato. 385 BC. Symposium. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1600/1600-h/1600-h.htm#link2H_4_0002.